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INTRODUCTION

In determining who may be subject to liability for injuries
caused by defective or disappointing' productr, a growing number
of courts have shifted their emphasis from traditional negligence
law to the policies and theories of strict liability in tort. The imposition of liability for negligence has been based traditionally on the
idea that one should compensate for injuries caused by his misfeasance 2 or nonfeasance. 3 The risk of loss, with few exceptions,4 has
1. Disappointing products are those that do not live up to the representations of their
sellers. For a comprehensive examination of liability for product disappointment see Shapo,
A Representative Theory of Consumer Protection:Doctrine,Function and Legal Liabilityfor
Product Disappointment, 60 VA. L. Rxv. 1109 (1974). This Recent Development focuses
primarily on that subcategory of disappointing products that also prove to be defective.
2. Misfeasance is "the improper performance of some act which a man may lawfully
do." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1151 (4th ed. 1951).

3. Nonfeasance is the "nonperformance of some act which ought to be performed,
omission to perform a required duty at all, or total neglect of duty." BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY
1208 (4th ed. 1951).
4. The exceptions fall under the label "imputed negligence": because of some relationship between two individuals, one of them will be held accountable for the negligence of the
other. For a discussion of various examples of imputed negligence see W. PROSSER, LAW OF
TORTS §§ 69-74 (4th ed. 1971) [hereinafter cited as PROSSER].
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been placed on the party at fault, 5 and the element of fault has
assisted courts in identifying the party against whom a suit for
negligence would lie. Strict liability, on the other hand, removes the
element of fault from the products liability suit.' The imposition of
liability without proof of negligence or fault has required courts to
find new indicia for identifying the parties against whom a claim
may be asserted, and consequently, courts have permitted products
liability suits to be brought against a wide array of defendants. 7 The
common characteristic of the various defendants is that each has
participated in the business of supplying the product causing the
injury.8
In their search for indicia to determine what parties may be
subject to strict liability, most courts have disallowed actions
against one class of potential defendants by adopting a corporate
law rule intended to limit a transferee's liability to creditors of the
transferor.9 The rule states simply that a transferee corporation that
5. See Id. § 75, at 492-93. "Fault" is an ambiguous term that can lead to confusion.
The term will be used in this Recent Development, however, because it is the only common
term that succinctly conveys the idea of a lack of both wrongful intent and negligence. See
generally id. § 75.
6. Wade, Strict Tort Liability of Manufacturers,19 Sw. L.J. 5 passim (1965), reprinted
in 32 ALA. LAw. 455 passim (1971). The element of fault is removed in the sense that an
injured plaintiff need not prove negligence or fault on the part of a defendant. Strict liability,
however, is not fault-free liability. Since the plaintiff must show a defect in the product, fault
on the part of someone in the chain of distribution may be inferred. Carmichael, Strict
Liability in Tort - An Explosion in ProductsLiability Law, 20 DRAKE L. REV. 528, 539 n.72
(1971); Frauen, Submission of a Strict ProductsLiability Case (A Defense Lawyer's View),
20 FED'N INS. COUNSEL Q., Spring 1970, at 22, 24; see PROSSER, supra note 4, at § 75; Lascher,
Strict Liability in Tort for Defective Products:The Road To and Past Vandermark, 38 S. CAL.
L. REV. 30, 47-48 (1965); Wade, The ContinuingDevelopment of Strict Liability in Tort, 22
ARK. L. REv. 233, 242-43 (1968). The inference of fault that arises from the proof of a defect
should not be confused with the inference that may arise from the presence of a defect under
the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. PROSSER, supra, § 103, at 672-73; compare id. at 494-96, with
id. at 214-18. But see Wade, supra, at 25, 32 ALA. LAW. at 479. Unlike the strict liability
plaintiff, a plaintiff who is able to prove negligence from the presence of a defect under the
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur has the further job of identifying a particular party to whom that
negligence is attributable. PROSSER, supra, § 39, at 218.
7. Among those who have been held liable are manufacturers, wholesalers, distributors,
retailers, restaurant operators, lessors, bailors, trademark licensors, and manufacturers of
component parts of defective products. For detailed lists of cases and authorities supporting
the liability of such defendants see Prosser, The Fall of the Citadel (Strict Liability to the
Consumer), 50 MINN. L. REV. 791, 814-15 (1966) [hereinfter cited as Prosser, The Falll; 27
ME. L. REv. 305 & nn.2-6. For an excellent discussion of the bases for seller and nonseller
defendant liability see Carmichael, supra note 6, at 556-62.
8. Prosser, The Fall, supra note 7, at 814.
9. For cases in which courts have adopted this majority rule see 15 W. FLETCHER,
CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 7122, at 189-91
[hereinafter cited as FLETCHER]; Annot., 66 A.L.R.3d 824 (1975).

n.1 (rev. perm. ed. 1973)
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purchases the assets of a transferor corporation will not be accountable for the unassumed debts of the transferor.'0 A sale of assets,
unlike a transfer of ownership by sale of stock or by merger or
consolidation, conceptually is a transfer of property from one entity
to another." The transfer of a business by a sale of stock is considered a change in the ownership of the corporation, but not a change
in ownership of the business assets. The business assets are owned
by the corporation itself both before and after the sale of stock.'" The
corporate entity concept, when combined with the negligence theory
that the party who is at fault should bear the risk of loss,'" produces
a willingness on the part of most courts to dismiss a products liability suit against a transferee corporation without ever reaching the
strict liability policy of spreading the risk of loss by shifting it to the
manufacturer and the chain of distribution so that the cost of defects will be reflected in an increased price of the product.' 4 Thus,
the corporate law rule creates a barrier to the consideration of strict
liability policy goals in determining transferee liability to parties
injured by the defective products of the transferor corporation.' 5
In the landmark decision, Greenman v. Yuba Power Products,
Inc., ,1the California Supreme Court eliminated a similar barrier to
consideration of products liability goals-the breach of warranty
theory designed to meet the needs of commercial transactions.
Justice Traynor addressed the central question-"When should
the manufacturer be responsible to those injured by his products?"'-and concluded that "rules . . . that were developed to

meet the needs of commercial transactions cannot properly be invoked to govern the manufacturer's liability to those injured by
their defective products unless those rules also serve the purposes
for which such liability is imposed."' 8 Confronted with another cen10. FLETCHER, supra note 9, at § 7122, at 188.
11. Note, Assumption of Products Liability in CorporateAcquisitions, 55 B.U.L. REv.
86, 92-93 (1975).
12. See Note, supra note 11, at 92-93.
13. See note 6 supra.
14. On the topic of risk spreading, see generally Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 24
Cal. 2d 453, 462, 150 P.2d 436, 441 (1944); Carmichael, supra note 6, at 531-32; Prosser, The
Assault Upon the Citadel (StrictLiability to the Consumer), 69 YALE L.J. 1099, 1120 (1960);
Shapo, supra note 1, at 1258-64; Note, supra note 11, at 89-90.
15. Note, supra note 11, at 91; see FLETCHER, supra note 9, at § 7123.
16. 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1963); see notes 24-29 infra and
accompanying text.
17. Traynor, The Ways and Meanings of Defective Products and Strict Liability, 32
TENN. L. Rv. 363, 365 (1965). Although the decision made no attempt to define the central
question, Justice Traynor, in hindsight, phrased the issue as quoted.
18. 59 Cal. 2d at 63, 377 P.2d at 901, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 701.
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tral issue-Who may be held liable as a defendant to a products
liability suit?-several federal courts and most recently two state
courts have critically reexamined the corporate law rule that had
been used to determine, within a limited context, who could be
subject to liability and who could not. 9 Finding that the corporate
law rule is not always consistent with the purposes for which strict
liability is imposed,2 0 several federal courts have found ways to
avoid the undesirable result of the corporate law analysis by broadening existing exceptions to the majority rule of transferee nonliability.21 Two recent state court cases, Turner v. Bituminous Casualty
Co. 22 and Ray v. Alad Corp.,ss have followed the federal courts by
criticizing the corporate law creditor liability approach. These cases
hold that a products liability suit for damages caused by the products of the transferor corporation may be maintained against a
transferee corporation that purchased for cash all the assets of the
transferor. This discussion will examine the Turner and Ray decisions, focusing on the different rationales used by each court to
arrive at a common holding of transferee liability.
I.

A.

BACKGROUND

Policy and Strict Liability in Tort

The California Supreme Court in Greenman v. Yuba Power
19. In articles on the topic of strict liability, discussion often is divided into sections
dealing with particular issues that might arise in a given products liability suit. Among the
divisions of such an article into its issue areas, one is likely to find sections entitled "What
Products?" "What Plaintiffs?" and "What Defendants?" See, e.g., Prosser, The Fall, supra
note 7. The question of transferee liability for the defective products of the transferor properly
falls within the framework of the broader issue "What Defendants?" The purpose for phrasing
the central issue in the general terms-Who may be held liable as a defendant to a products
liability suit?-is to impress upon the reader that transferee liability or nonliability should
be viewed as one of many questions arising in a products strict liability suit rather than as a
question of corporate law that intervenes to cause dismissal of the suit before the strict
liability issues are addressed. See text accompanying note 31 infra.
20. See Knapp v. North American Rockwell Corp., 506 F.2d 361, 369 (3d Cir. 1974),
cert. denied 421 U.S. 965 (1975) (resolution of the issue of transferee liability requires "an
analysis of public policy considerations rather than . . . a mere procrustean application of
formalities."), noted in 6 SETON HALL L. REV. 477 (1975); Cyr v. B. Offen & Co., 501 F.2d
1145, 1153 (1st Cir. 1974) ("Thus where tort liability is concerned we should look to factors
relevant to the specific claim and not be bound by the factors that control where other debts
and liabilities are concerned."), commented on in 16 B.C. IND. & COM. L. Rav. 676 (1975)
and 27 ME. L. Rv. 305 (1975); Shannon v. Samuel Langston Co., 379 F. Supp. 797 (W.D.
Mich. 1974); Fairfield v. Samuel Langston Co., No. K-18-71 CA (W.D. Mich. Mar. 12, 1974).
21. See Part II. B. infra.
22. 397 Mich. 406, 244 N.W.2d 873 (1976).
23. 19 Cal. 3d 22, 560 P.2d 3, 136 Cal. Rptr. 574 (1977).
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Products, Inc., 24 adopted the doctrine of products liability in tort
without negligence, and without regard to breach of warranty. 25 The
plaintiff in that case had been injured by a defective power tool. The
manufacturer of the power tool defended on the ground that the
plaintiff had failed to notify him of the breach of warranty as required by the Uniform Sales Act. 2 Reasoning that rules designed to
meet the needs of commercial transactions should not be used to
govern the outcome of products liability cases unless those commercial rules also serve the purposes for which products liability is
imposed, 27 the court concluded that it would no longer determine
the liability of a manufacturer for his defective products by use of
the breach of warranty theory. That theory and its notice requirements conflicted with the products liability goal of insuring that the
costs of injuries from defective products are borne by the manufacturers that placed the products on the market rather than by the
injured individuals who were powerless to protect themselves.2
Thus, the court eliminated a substantial bar to recovery imposed by
the commercial breach of warranty theory for deciding when a manufacturer would be liable for his defective products and replaced it
with the doctrine of strict liability.29
B.

The CorporateLaw Rule of Transferee Nonliability and the
Broadening of Its Exceptions

Until recently the courts considered the issue of transferee liability as a question of corporate law rather than as one of strict
liability. In jurisdictions applying the corporate law rule, a transferee defendant to a products liability suit ordinarily moves for summary judgment on the ground that a transferee corporation is not
liable for the unassumed obligations of the transferor just as an
24. 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1963) (Traynor, C.J.), noted in 17
Sw. L.J. 669 (1963).
25. See Prosser, The Fall, supra note 7, at 803; Wade, supra note 6, at 9-10, 32 ALA.
LAw. at 461; Note, Expanding the ProductsLiability of Successor Corporations,27 HASTINGS
L.J. 1305 (1976).
26. At the time of the decision in Greenman, the Uniform Sales Act in California
provided that notice of breach of warranty be given to the maker of the warranty within a
prescribed time after the alleged breach. If notice were not given, the cause of action for
breach of warranty expired. Uniform Sales Act, ch. 1070, § 1, 1931 Cal. Stats. 2238 (repealed
1963); see Prosser, The Fall, supra note 7, at 803.
27. 59 Cal. 2d at 63, 377 P.2d at 901, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 701; see Traynor, supra note 16,
at 365-66 ("One cannot look to warranty . . ., for it was designed to ensure commercial
satisfaction rather than compensation for physical injury.").
28. 59 Cal. 2d at 63, 377 P.2d at 901, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 701.
29. Prosser, The Fall, supra note 7, at 805.
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individual is not responsible for the debts of a stranger. Thus, the
corporate law rule designed to define a transferee's liability to a
transferor's creditors intervenes to prevent suit against a transferee
for the defective products of the transferor. Because a products liability plaintiff is in the same position as any other creditor," most
courts would dismiss the action against a transferee corporation
without reaching the policy reasons for imposing strict liability on
a defendant to a products liability suit. 31 To avoid having his suit
dismissed, a plaintiff must allege the existence of facts sufficient to
require the application of one of the four well-established exceptions
to the general rule. According to these exceptions the transferee may
be held liable for the obligations of the transferor (1) when there is
an express or implied agreement to assume those obligations, (2)
when the transaction amounts to a de facto merger or consolidation
of the transferor with the transferee, (3) when the transaction is a
fraudulent attempt to escape liability, or (4) when the transferee
corporation is a mere continuation of the transferor.32 Several federal courts have criticized the general rule as being incompatible
with the polcies behind strict products liability.3 3 Nevertheless, by
disguising their break with the corporate law rule through references
to one or more of its exceptions, the courts have left the impression
30. Although the plaintiff in a products liability case receives the same treatment under
the corporate law analysis as creditors, the contract of sale between the transferor and the
transferee usually contains an express provision for the assumption of all noncontingent debts
and liabilities. Thus, as a practical matter, a plaintiff in a products liability suit is in a worse
position than creditors to whom obligations had arisen prior to the date of sale because those
creditors will be able to recover against the transferee on contract grounds.
31. See note 15 supra and accompanying text.
32. Shane v. Hoban, Inc., 332 F. Supp. 526, 527-28 (E.D. Pa. 1971); Kloberdanz v. Joy
Mfg. Co., 288 F. Supp. 817, 820 (D. Colo. 1968); see FLETCHER, supra note 9, at § 7122 & at
192-96 nn.6-11; Annot., 66 A.L.R.3d 824, 834-53 (1975); Note, supra note 25, at 1311 & nn.3741; see also Annot., 49 A.L.R.3d 881, 883-90 (1973) (discussion of the fraud exception). For
cases construing statutes relevant to exceptions to the general rule see Annot., 66 A.L.R.3d
824, 854-55. For breach of duty to warn as giving rise to transferee liability, wholly apart from
the exceptions to the general rule of nonliability see id. at 853-54; Wallach, ProductsLiability: A Remedy in Search of a Defendant-The Effect of a Sale of Assets and Subsequent
Dissolution on ProductDissatisfactionClaims, 41 Mo. L. REv. 321, 342-44 (1976). For breach
of duty to warn, generally, see Kidwell, The Duty to Warn: A Description of the Model
Decision, 53 TEx. L. REv. 1375 (1975).
33. See note 20 supra and accompanying text; Juenger & Schulman, Assets Sales and
Products Liability, 22 WAYNE L. Rav. 39, 54-55 (1975). Concern for the plight of a plaintiff
who has been injured by the products of a dissolved corporation has been responsible, in part,
for the increased interest in finding a solvent defendant for the plaintiff. The search for
defendants may be the moving force behind the re-evaluation of the general rule. For discussions of the difficulties connected with finding a defendant in such situations see Henn &
Alexander, Effect of CorporateDissolutionon ProductsLiability Claims, 56 CORNELL L. REV.
865 (1971); Wallach, supra note 32.
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that their real intent is simply to broaden the existing exceptions
rather than to abandon the general rule."
Foremost among the federal court cases criticizing the general
rule is Cyr v. B. Offen & Co.,35 until recently the only case holding
a purchaser of assets for cash liable for the transferor's defective
products.3 6 Following the death of the sole proprietor of the B. Offen
Company, key employees of the company formed a corporation and
purchased the proprietor's assets from the executor of his estate.
The new corporation, B. Offen & Co., agreed to assume the obligation to service the transferor's products but expressly refused to
assume the transferor's tort liabilities. To justify its imposition of
transferee liability, the First Circuit Court of Appeals emphasized
that the policy reasons for imposing strict liability on the transferor
were equally applicable for holding the transferee strictly liable.37
Ultimately, however, the court phrased its holding not in terms of
strict liability, but rather in terms that suggested a reliance on the
continuity exception to the general rule of transferee nonliability.3 8
Because of the particular facts present, the continuity exception was
the only state law ground upon which the decision to impose liability on the transferee could be made. To impose liability on a theory
34. When federal jurisdiction is based on diversity of citizenship, a federal court must
apply the law of the state in which the case arose, as though the federal court were a court of
the state in which it sits. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938); see 36 C.J.S. Federal
Courts § 165(2) (1960). Because the law of the states is the corporate law rule of transferee
nonliability, the federal courts are bound by the Erie doctrine to determine transferee liability
in accordance with the corporate law rule. Therefore, despite strong criticism of the general
rule followed by the states, federal courts have phrased their holdings of transferee liability
to fit within the framework of one of the exceptions to the corporate law rule of transferee
nonliability. Juenger & Schulman, supra note 33, at 54-55; see, e.g., Note, supra note 25, at
1321.
35.

501 F.2d 1145 (1st Cir. 1974). For a criticism of the case see 16 B.C. IND. & COM. L.

REv. 676 (1975). For a discussion praising the case, see 27 ME. L. Rav. 305 (1975).
36. Note, supra note 25, at 1320.
37. According to the court,
The manufacturer's successor, carrying over the experience and expertise of the manufacturer, is likewise in a better position than the consumer to gauge the risks and the
costs of meeting them. The successor knows the product . . . and is the only entity
capable of improving the quality of the product .

. .

. [I]t is true that the successor

• . . was not the legal entity which launched the product on the stream of commerce or
made an implied representation as to its safety. But in the most real sense it is profiting
from land] exploiting all of the accumulated good will which the products have earned,
both in its outward representations of continuity and in its internal adherence to the
same line of equipment.
501 F.2d at 1154.
38. Juenger & Schulman, supra note 33, at 51; Wallach, supra note 32, at 338; 16 B.C.
IND. & COM. L. REv. 676, 678 (1975); Note, supra note 25, at 1321; see 27 ME. L. REv. 305
supra note 35.
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that the transferee impliedly assumed the transferor's tort liabilities would be extremely difficult, since the purchase agreement expressly excluded assumption of such liabilities. There could be no
de facto merger since the assets were purchased not from another
corporation but from a sole proprietor's estate. 9 The fraud exception to the general rule was unavailable since there was no evidence
whatsoever that the transaction was undertaken to escape liability
fraudulently. Therefore, the federal court could follow in form the
law of the state in which this diversity action arose only by justifying
its decision on the continuity exception to the general rule, which
requires a continuity of business and a continuity of ownership." In
order to hold that the incorporated B. Offen & Co. was a mere
continuation of the sole proprietorship B. Offen Company, however,
the court had to eliminate the historically essential "substantial
identity of ownership" 4' element of the continuity exception. As
authority that continuity of ownership was not determinative of
transferee responsibility, the court relied on a labor law test used
to determine when a transferee will be bound by certain collective
bargaining agreements signed by the transferor.42 Although ignoring
the absence of continuity of ownership, the court did emphasize the
operational continuity.4 3 The court's attempt to fit its holding
within the framework of the continuity exception may have been an
intentional effort to avoid being overturned for not following state
39. Juenger & Schulman, supra note 33, at 51.
40. The court proposed an alternative state law basis for the decision in the form of a
makeweight respondeat superior argument:
The negligence of employees in carrying out that business is the responsibility of the
corporate body. If as a group the same employees continue, without pause to produce
the same products in the same plant, with the same supervision, the ownership of the
entity which maintains essentially the same name cannot be the sole controlling determinant of liability.
501 F.2d at 1154; see Juenger & Schulman, supra note 33, at 52, 54; Note, supra note 25, at
1321 n.91.
41. See note 38 supra. The elements of the continuity exception are characteristics that
would lead a court to conclude that a transferee was essentially the same entity as the
transferor with only a change of form or corporate name. Continuity of ownership, plant
location, trade name, and other such elements are all traditionally necessary to a finding of
sufficient continuity to justify holding the transferee liable for the defective products of its
predecessor manufacturer.
42. The test from John Wiley & Sons v. Livingston, 376 U.S. 543 (1964), considered the
following criteria to be indicative of continuity: "the composition and size of the work force,
personnel policy, production lapses, product changes, change in plant location, and changes
in internal operations, as well as manner of succession." 27 ME. L. REv., supra note 35, at
313.
43. Juenger & Schulman, supra note 33, at 53.
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law as required by the Erie doctrine." On the other hand, the court's
need for a test to determine which transferees should be held liable
may have led to the unintentional mingling of negligence law with
strict liability.45 The use of continuity terminology to phrase its
holding suggests that the court was determining liability by attributing some degree of fault to the transferee corporation. Whatever
the court's reason for using the continuity language, its decision had
the effect of broadening the continuity exception so that a transferee
might be more readily subjected to strict liability for a transferor's
defective products.
In Shannon v. Samuel Langston Co.," a diversity case litigated
in Michigan but applying New Jersey law,47 a federal court examined the leading New Jersey case, McKee v. Harris-Seybold Co.,"s
and educed a four-part test for determining when a sale and purchase of assets constitutes a de facto merger. Thus, under the de
facto merger exception to the general rule of transferee nonliability,
a transferee would be liable for injuries caused by the transferor's
defective products when the following circumstances are present:
(1) There is a continuation of the enterprise of the seller corporation, so
that there is a continuity of management, personnel, physical location, assets,
and general business operations.
(2) There is a continuity of shareholders which results from the
purchasing corporationpaying for the acquired assets with shares of its own
stock, this stock ultimately coming to be held by the shareholders of the seller
corporation so that they become a constituent part of the purchasing corporation.
(3) The seller corporation ceases its ordinary business operations, liquidates, and dissolves as soon as legally and practically possible.
(4) The purchasing corporation assumes those liabilities and obligations
of the seller ordinarily necessary for the uninterrupted continuation of normal
business operations of the seller corporation.4

The court distinguished McKee, which reached a holding of no
transferee liability on facts otherwise identical to those in Shannon,
44. This potential explanation for the court's concern with the continuity exception is
discussed in Juenger & Schulman, supra note 33, at 54. For a discussion of the Erie doctrine
and its application in this context see note 34 supra.
45. See Note, supra note 25, at 1321 n.91. On the requirement of proof of fault see note
6 supra.
46. 379 F. Supp. 797 (W.D. Mich. 1974).
47. Although the accident occurred in Michigan, the defendant's transferor had manufactured the allegedly defective product in New Jersey and the defendant continued to operate the New Jersey manufacturing plant as a wholly-owned subsidiary.
48. 109 N.J. Super. 555, 264 A.2d 98 (1970), aff'd, 118 N.J. Super. 480, 288 A.2d 585
(1972).
49. 379 F. Supp. at 801 (citing McKee v. Harris-Seybold Co., 109 N.J. Super. at 56367, 264 A.2d at 103-05) (emphasis added).
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on the basis of the second criterion above. Whereas the purchaser
in McKee paid mainly cash, the transferee in Shannon paid for the
transferor's assets with shares of the transferee's own stock." To the
extent that the transferor's shareholders retained their stock in the
transferee after the transferor's dissolution, there was continuity of
ownership. Although the court referred to the test in terms of the
de facto merger exception, the first two components are the traditional elements of the continuity exception. The fourth part of the
test is more relevant to the implied assumption of tort liabilities
exception than to the de facto merger exception. Apparently, there
is considerable overlap of the traditional exceptions to the general
rule. Indeed for most factual situations5' the de facto merger exception and the continuity exception are alternative rationales for
achieving the same result.52
Through the use of what it referred to as the de facto merger
exception, the court in Shannon found the transferee corporation
liable for the defective products of the transferor. Yet, the de facto
merger doctrine as applied in Shannon resembled the de facto
merger doctrine as applied in McKee little more than the Cyr continuity exception resembled traditional notions of continuity. Neither
of the federal courts addressed the issue of transferee liability as
though it were simply a matter of corporate law and creditors'
rights. Instead the courts in both Cyr and Shannon went beyond
traditional state court analysis and considered the impact of the
general rule of transferee nonliability on strict liability policy goals.
The courts thus took a major step toward viewing the issue of transferee liability not as a question to be decided solely on corporate law
principles but rather as one of several questions to be answered in
a products liability context.53 Concluding that transferee nonliability in Cyr and Shannon was inconsistent with the reasons for imposing strict liability in such cases, the two federal courts defined the
exceptions to the general rule in such a way that they were broad
enough to justify the imposition of transferee liability on state law
grounds.
50. 379 F. Supp. at 801-02.
51. The facts of Cyr presented a situation in which the continuity exception produced
a holding of transferee liability even though the de facto merger exception would not have
been available to circumvent the corporate law rule. See note 39 supra and accompanying
text.
52. Wallach, supra note 32, at 340.
53. See generally note 19 and text accompanying note 31 supra.
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RECENT STATE COURT CASES

Turner v. Bituminous Casualty Co.

In Turner" the plaintiff brought a products liability suit against
the defendant transferee corporation for injuries caused by a defective power press manufactured by the transferor. Defendant moved
for summary judgment on the ground that it was a corporate
stranger to the transferor who had manufactured and sold the power
press. The trial court granted the defendant's motion for summary
judgment and the appellate court denied leave to appeal. Reversing
the trial court, the Supreme Court of Michigan held that a transferee corporation that purchased for cash all the assets of the transferor corporation could be subject to liability for the defective products manufactured by the transferor as long as three conditions were
satisfied. The three conditions are the first, third, and fourth parts
of the Shannon test,55 which the Turner court concluded were the
tests for continuity of interest,56 the true controlling factor. Thus,
the court in Turnerdecided to eliminate the requirement of continuity of ownership, the second component of the Shannon test, as a
determinative factor in the test for transferee liability, 57 just as the
First Circuit Court of Appeals in Cyr v. B. Offen & Co., had abolished continuity of ownership from its version of the continuity
exception to the general rule. In Cyr the necessity of conforming
with state law produced the terminology indicating that transferee
liability was based on the continuity exception to the general rule. 8
The Supreme Court of Michigan had no obligation to conform its
decision to the majority rule of transferee nonliability. Although the
court strongly criticized the corporate law approach to determining
transferee liability,59 the retention of the three steps of the Shannon
54. 397 Mich. 406, 244 N.W.2d 873 (1976).
55. 397 Mich. at
, 244 N.W.2d at 883; see text accompanying note 49 supra.
56. 397 Mich. at __,
244 N.W.2d at 883. Although the Turner continuity of interest
test requires liquidation of the transferor and assumption of the business debts by the
transferee, the primary emphasis is on continuity of the manufacturing enterprise in essentially the same form it had at the time the defective product was produced and sold. For a
discussion of continuity of enterprise see text accompanying notes 84-87 infra.
57. The Turner court's reliance on Shannon is somewhat mystifying since the only
element of the Shannon test that Turner rejected, continuity of ownership, was the very
element used by the Shannon court to distinguish McKee. See text accompanying notes 4850 supra. The result is that Turner, purporting to follow a test educed by the Shannon court
from McKee, has arrived at a holding exactly the opposite of the holding in McKee despite
substantially identical facts.
58. See note 44 supra and accompanying test. But cf. Note, supra note 25, at 1321 n.91
(possible alternative reason for use of the continuity language by the court).
59. The Turner court quotes the most potent language of the California Court of Ap-
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test implies either that the Turner court was satisfied with the test
developed from an exception to the corporate law rule or that the
court was unable to devise a new standard for identifying who may
be liable as a defendant in a products liability action."
B. Ray v. Alad Corp.
In Ray' the plaintiff brought a products liability action against
the defendant transferee corporation for injuries caused by a defective ladder that was manufactured and sold by the transferor before
the defendant purchased the transferor's assets, name, and product
line. The defendant moved for summary judgment on the ground
that it was a corporate stranger to the manufacturer of the allegedly
defective product. The plaintiff contended that the defendant transferee should be held liable because it had impliedly assumed the
unspecified liabilities of the transferor and because it was a mere
continuation of the transferor corporation. Concluding that the
plaintiff had failed to allege facts sufficient to fit the case into one
of the exceptions to the general rule of transferee nonliability, the

trial court granted the defendant's motion. In overturning the trial
court's dismissal of the action, the California Court of Appeals for
the Second District held that a products liability suit could be
peals decision in Ray on this very point:
These observations focus on the wrong problem. This case has nothing to do with
the interpretation of the contract between Alad I and Alad II; nor does it hinge on the
technical differences between a sale of assets . . . ..merger, [and] consolidation ....
The issue is, rather, one of tort law: does a manufacturer's responsibility for its
defective products survive a change in ownership, where the manufacturing business, as
such, maintains its identity and continues to operate as before "at the same old stand."
397 Mich. at -, 244 N.W.2d at 880-81, quoting Ray v. Alad Corp., 55 Cal. App. 3d at -,
127 Cal. Rptr. at 819-20 (1976), vacated, 19 Cal. 3d 22, 560 P.2d 3, 136 Cal. Rptr. 574 (1977).
60. That the court was searching for various rationales to justify its decision is apparent
from the following makeweight argument: "Justice would be offended if a corporation which
holds itself out as a particular company for the purpose of sales, would not be estopped from
denying that it is that company for the purpose of determining products liability." 397 Mich.
at -,
244 N.W.2d at 882. The makeweight argument appears in the decision again as
though it were, along with the three elements of the Shannon test, the basis for a fourth
requirement for establishing "a prima facie case of continuation of corporate responsibility
for products liability." Id. at -, 244 N.W.2d at 884. This makeweight "estoppel" argument
falls short of its mark, because justice is only offended when a corporation escapes liability
to someone who relied on the corporation's representation that it was the manufacturer of
the defective product. In other words, the consumer must have believed the defendant was
the manufacturer at the time of purchase. Cf. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTS § 400, Comment d (1965). Although the court in Turner cited this source as support by analogy, this
provision is only applicable when, due to the representations of the defendant, the consumer
purchased the product with the mistaken belief that the defendant manufactured or exercised
control over the manufacture of the product.
61. 19 Cal. 3d 22, 560 P.2d 3, 136 Cal. Rptr. 574 (1977).
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maintained against the transferee because liability for defective
products attaches to the manufacturing business itself regardless of
changes in ownership. 2 The California Supreme Court vacated the
opinion of the Court of Appeals and held that a transferee that
continues the output of a product line is subject to strict tort liability for defective units of the same product line that were manufactured and sold by the transferor. 3
The Supreme Court of California arrived at its holding of transferee liability by completely repudiating the corporate law rule in
the products liability context. Finding none of the four traditional
exceptions to the general rule of transferee nonliability to be available, the court concluded that it would have to affirm the trial
court's summary judgment if it adhered to the corporate law analysis. Furthermore, the court rejected the plaintiff's contention that
the continuity exception to the corporate law rule should be broadened as it was in Cyr v. B. Offen & Co., 64 since it felt that such a
holding would set an undesirable precedent for courts assessing liability to creditors in general as opposed to products liability plaintiffs. Therefore, in order to effectuate the paramount strict liability
policy of spreading to society the risk of loss from defective products61 and at the same time avoid an undue broadening of the continuity exception, the court decided to find transferee liability by a
special departure from the traditional corporate law analysis. 6"
According to the court, three reasons justify the imposition of
liability on the transferee. First, the liquidation of the transferor,
which is a usual consequence of the transferee's acquisition of all the
62. Ray v. Alad Corp., 55 Cal. App. 3d 855, 127 Cal. Rptr. 817 (1976), vacated, 19 Cal.
3d 22, 560 P.2d 3, 136 Cal. Rptr. 574 (1977). The Court of Appeals sought to devise a test for
transferee liability from the policy considerations that justify the imposition of strict liability
in tort. The test arrived at by the court would impose liability not on the particular entity
that owned the manufacturing enterprise but rather on the manufacturing enterprise itself.
The court determined transferee liability by examining evidence relevant to a decision that
the manufacturing business at the date of suit is the same manufacturing business that was
in existence on the day the defective product was manufactured. That evidence-continuity
of management, key personnel, physical location, assets, and business operations-is the
same evidence that would lead the Turner court to find that there was a continuity of
enterprise sufficient to hold the transferee liable for the defective products of the transferor.
See text accompanying notes 71-72 infra.
63. Ray v. Alad Corp., 19 Cal. 3d 22, 560 P.2d 3, 136 Cal. Rptr. 574 (1977).
64. 501 F.2d 1145 (1st Cir. 1974); see text accompanying notes 35-45 supra.
65. See note 14 supra.
66. 19 Cal. 3d at __,
560 P.2d at , 136 Cal. Rptr. at 579. Ray weighed the
commercial need for insulating the transferee from liability against the need for continued
protection of those injured by defective products and concluded that the corporate law rule
should be suspended in the narrow area defined by the facts of the case at hand. Id. at -,
560 P.2d at -, 136 Cal. Rptr. at 576.
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assets of the transferor, deprives the injured plaintiff of a formerly
solvent defendant. The liquidation of the transferor, when combined with the practical difficulties of satisfying a judgment against
the transferor corporation from the distributed assets held by former
stockholders and directors, usually precludes recovery by a plaintiff
from any source other than the transferee. 7 Secondly, the transferee
is in the best position to insure that the costs of injuries from defective products are spread to the current customers of the product
line. The transferee ordinarily has information necessary to gauge
the risks of injury from previously manufactured items and can
increase the price of products to meet those risks or, in the alternative, obtain insurance to cover such risks.68 Finally, the transferee
purchased the transferor's business and continued to market the
transferor's product line under the same trade name, holding itself
out as the transferor, in order to obtain the benefit of the transferor's
goodwill. Since the transferor manufacturer could not have enjoyed
its goodwill without the burden of liability for defective products,
to allow the transferee to benefit from the transferor's goodwill without shouldering the attendant responsibilities would be unfair to the
consuming public. In addition, the possibility of contingent liabilities should be reflected in the price paid by the transferee for the
transferor's goodwill in order to prevent a windfall to the stockholders of the transferor; otherwise, shareholders might have the transferor sell its goodwill at an enhanced price, liquidate the transferor,
and thus shield themselves in most cases from the liabilities that
had formerly attached to the goodwill.
IV.

COMPARISON AND ANALYSIS OF THE Turner AND Ray STANDARDS
FOR DETERMINING TRANSFEREE LIABILITY

Reaching the same result, transferee liability, on substantially
identical facts, both Turner and Ray recognize that the corporate
law rule of transferee nonliability yields results that are inconsistent
with the policies underlying strict liability for defective products.
The decisions, however, establish different standards for determining who may be subject to a products liability suit. Under Turner,
a transferee corporation is subject to liability for the defective products of the transferor if (1) the transferee continues the enterprise
of the transferor, including a retention of key personnel, physical
67. Liquidation of the transferor, if not followed by a dissolution, will at least render
the transferor insolvent. See Henn & Alexander, supra note 33; Wallach, supra note 32.
68. See note 75 infra and accompanying text.
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location, assets, and general business operations, (2) the transferor
corporation liquidates and dissolves as soon as possible following the
acquisition, and (3) the transferee assumes the liabilities of the
transferor necessary to the uninterrupted continuation of the business enterprise. 9 Under Ray, a transferee is subject to liability for
the defective products of the transferor if the transferee continues
to place the transferor's former product line on the market. Additionally, because of the reasons that the court used to justify imposition of transferee liability, liquidation of the transferor and exploitation of the transferor's goodwill may be second and third requirements for determining transferee liability. A comparison of the
Turner and Ray standards reveals divergent theories of liability that
led in Turner to the development of continuity of enterprise' and
in Ray to continuity of product line as the primary indicators of
transferee liability. Further insight may be gained by an examination of the requirement that the transferor liquidate, which is common to both cases, and an analysis of the third requirement of the
Turner test and what may be a third requirement of Ray.
A.

Continuity of Enterprise/Continuityof Product Line

A comparison of the first component of the Turner standard,
continuity of the transferor's enterprise, to the Ray standard emphasizing continuity of the transferor's product line indicates that
the two standards have their origins in different theories of liability.
Turner, searching for a test to determine what transferees would be
liable for the defective products of their transferors, adopted the
continuity of enterprise requirement devised by the federal court in
Shannon.7 Under Turner, a plaintiff would introduce evidence that
the management, personnel, physical location, assets, and general
business operations of the transferee were the same as those of the
transferor in order to prove continuity of enterprise. This evidence
tends to equate the transferee and the transferor. Like the de facto
merger, fraud, and continuity exceptions to the corporate law rule,
the continuity of enterprise concept provides a rationale by which
the court can ignore the separate identities of the transferee and the
transferor and thus justify holding the former responsible for the
obligations of the latter. The fiction that the transferee is a mere
69. 397 Mich. 406, 244 N.W.2d 873 (1976).
70. The Turner court admits that the first requirement of its test-basic continuity of
the transferor's enterprise-is the most significant of the three requirements. 397 Mich. at
-,
244 N.W.2d at 883.
71. See text accompanying notes 46-53 supra.
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continuation of the transferor is necessary in the overwhelming majority of courts that consider damages for injury from a defective
product to be an obligation of the entity that produced and sold the
particular item. 72 Were manufacturer liability based on
fault-negligence or willful misconduct-this means of indentifying
the potential defendants would be commendable. Strict liability,
however, requires no proof of fault on the part of any identifiable
party. 3 Therefore, it would seem futile to assess transferee liability
by devising a fictitious scheme for imputing fault that need not even
exist. Because the Ray standard was educed directly from a strict
liability policy, the court avoided the necessity of a fiction for treating two entities as one and was able to hold that products liability
attaches to the product line itself. The continuity of product line
standard, which is explicitly established by the Ray holding, has its
origin in the second justification for departing from the corporate
law analysis: the transferee is in the best position to spread the risk
of loss. Using the continuity of product line standard, the Ray court
determined transferee liability not by examining evidence tending
to equate the transferee enterprise with the transferor enterprise but
rather by examining evidence, such as product utility and trade
name, that tends to show uniformity of the transferor's defective
product and the transferee's product line.
Continuity of product line is the only standard that can be
justified on strict liability policy grounds as a method for identifying
and limiting the class of potential products liability defendants.
The fundamental purpose of strict liability is to insure that the
individual and social costs of product defects are included in the
costs of production 74 so that the product will pay for its own defects.
If the transferee manufacturer or seller of the product carries liability insurance, the risk of loss will be spread to the general public and
the actual cost of defects in the product will be determined by the
actuarial risk involved. The cost of the defects or potential defects
will be reflected as the cost of insurance premiums, and that cost
will be passed on through increased prices to all consumers of the
product. The availability or nonavailability of insurance should not
be determinative, 75 however; the ultimate rationale for the test
72. "Although the purpose of imposing strict liability is to create a broader and more
widely available basis of recovery, the basis has always been linked to a seller or manufacturer." 16 B.C. IND. & COM. L. REV. 676, 687 (1975). See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 402A (1965).
73. See note 6 supra.

74. See note 14 supra; RESTATEMENT
75.

(SECOND) OF

ToRTs § 402A, Comment c (1965).

For an example of the unavailability of liability insurance for transferee corpora-
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should be that all consumers of the product should share the costs
of risks involved in the use of that product to the greatest extent
possible.
B. Liquidation of the Transferor
There are indications in both Turner and Ray that liquidation
of the transferor corporation is a necessary prerequisite to recovery
from the transferee. Immediate liquidation and dissolution of the
transferor is the second component of the three part Turner test for
transferee liability. Ray does not mention a transferor liquidation
requirement in stating its holding, but the court does rely on the
nonavailability of a remedy against parties other than the transferee, which results from the liquidation of the transferor, as one of
the reasons justifying a departure from the corporate law rule of
transferee nonliability. Reliance upon the liquidation of the transferor implies that there would be no cause of action against the
transferee were the transferor still in existence and solvent. Ray, in
fact, used the availability of a solvent transferor to distinguish an
earlier California case that had refused to hold a transferee liable
even though the transferee continued to manufacture and sell the
product line formerly marketed by the transferor.7 ' Thus, under
both Turner and Ray a transferee defendant should be able to obtain summary judgment by proving the existence of a solvent transferor against whom the plaintiff could have brought suit.
Liquidation of the transferor is a requirement that has no relation to the purpose for which strict products liability is imposed.
Requiring dismissal of suit against a transferee whenever a solvent
transferor is available implies that the transferee's liability is secondary. The strict liability purpose of spreading the risk of loss
through an increased price of the product is inconsistent with a rule
imposing liability on a transferor that no longer has any connection
with the product line. If the transferor that has ceased to manufacture and sell the product line is held to be liable in preference to
the transferee that continues to place the product line on the market, then the only reason for such a preference must be the desire
to penalize the transferor for his fault-negligence or willful misconduct. Although there is no need for a products liability plaintiff to
prove fault on the part of any particular defendant in order for the
tions and the practical problems that the unavailability can cause see 16 B.C. IND. & Com.
L. REv. 676, 687 (1975).
76. 19 Cal. 3d at -

, 560 P.2d at

-,

136 Cal. Rptr. at 581 n.6.
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court to impose strict liability, proof of a defect in the product,
which is required, implies that someone involved in the manufacture and distribution was at fault.7 7 Considering the lack of even this
minute attribute of fault on the part of a transferee corporation that
was unrelated to the chain of distribution at the time the defect
allegedly occurred, courts may be reluctant to impose liability for
defective products on a transferee when the transferor is solvent.
Strict manufacturer liability, however, is not based on the negligence or willful misconduct of the transferor. Indeed, the transferor
may be as free from fault as the transferee. Because fault on the part
of an identifiable defendant is irrelevant to his being held strictly
liable, the equities of imposing liability on the transferor rather than
the transferee are outweighed, even if they exist, by what the Ray
court referred to as the paramount policy of strict liability-insuring
that the risks of injury from defective products are distributed to the
consumers of the product line as a cost of doing business. 78 Since the
goal of spreading the risk of loss by an increased cost of the product
is fulfilled by transferee rather than transferor liability, 7 the
Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc."0 principle that rules and
standards should not be used unless they serve the purposes for
which products liability is imposed dictates that the transferor liquidation requirement be abrogated.
C. Assumption of Liabilities and Exploitation of Goodwill
The final component of the Turner standard is the requirement
that the transferee corporation must have assumed the liabilities
and obligations of the transferor necessary to continuation of the
77.

See Carmichael, supra note 6, at 539 n.72; 16 B.C. IND. & COM. L. REV. 676, 687

(1975); Comment, Tort Defenses to Strict Liability, 20 SYRACUSE L. REv. 924 (1969).
78. 19 Cal. 3d at -_, 560 P.2d at -, 136 Cal. Rptr. at 579; see Escola v. Coca Cola
Bottling Co., 24 Cal. 2d 453, 462, 150 P.2d 436, 441 (1944) (Traynor, J., concurring).
79. The California Court of Appeals in Ray mentioned two frequently listed purposes
for imposing strict liability other than the risk spreading purpose upon which this discussion
has focused. 55 Cal. App. 3d at-_, 127 Cal. Rptr. at 820. Neither of those purposes supports
transferor rather than transferee liability. First, imposing liability on either transferor or
transferee will equally compensate the plaintiff who was helpless to insure or guard against
injury from a defective product. Secondly, the strict liability goal of encouraging improvements in the product is not facilitated by a rule that would impose liability upon a transferor
that no longer has any control over the manufacturing process. The argument that the transferor will be encouraged to make product improvements at the time of manufacture in order
to prevent liability in the future is not weakened by imposing liability on the transferee since
the transferor will have adequate incentive to improve products from the possibility of pretransfer liability.
80. 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1963); see text accompanying note
27 supra.
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transferor's normal business operations. As with the other two components of the Turner test this requirement originated as part of the
Shannon de facto merger exception to the corporate law rule. Imposing liability on only those transferees that assumed the necessary
business liabilities of the transferor is a method of insuring that only
those transferees with an intent to continue the business enterprises
are held liable. The requirement adds nothing useful to the continuity of enterprise component of the Turner test; on the other hand,
the requirement provides an easy means by which a transferee
might evade liability despite continuity of enterprise. By not assuming the transferor's liabilities and obligations, the transferee may be
able to escape liability to an injured plaintiff without any strict
liability policy reason for allowing such an escape.
The Ray court also opens the door for future attempts to avoid
liability by relying upon the goodwill requirement as one of the
reasons for imposing transferee liability. The third justification
given in Ray for departing from the traditional analysis of the corporate law rule and its exceptions is that the goodwill purchased by
the transferee carries with it the burden of liability for defects in the
products that gave rise to the goodwill." The court does not identify
failure to purchase the goodwill of the transferor as a characteristic
that would distinguish a case that had refused to hold a transferee
liable, but a court might refuse to depart from the traditional corporate law analysis on the ground that there had been no attempt by
the transferee to exploit the goodwill of the transferor. Such a result
would be inconsistent both with the holding as phrased by Ray and
with the strict liability goal that led to that holding. Permitting a
plaintiff to avoid strict liability by declining to exploit the goodwill
of the transferor will defeat the purpose for which transferee liability
is imposed-to spread the cost of product defects to the consumers
of like products.
V.

CONCLUSION

Both Turner and Ray rejected the corporate law approach and
refused to fit their holdings within the framework of one of the
exceptions to the general rule of transferee nonliability. Both decisions evidence a growing awareness of the inappropriateness of the
corporate analysis for determining what defendants may be liable
in a products liability suit. Turner borrowed its three-part test from
a decision that had justified transferee liability by broadening an
81.

19 Cal. 3d at

-,

560 P.2d at

-,

136 Cal. Rptr. at 580.
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existing exception to the corporate law rule. As a consequence, the
three components of the Turner test, including the essential continuity of enterprise component, resemble those exceptions to the
general rule that would tend to equate the transferor and the transferee. Ray, on the other hand, devised its continuity of product line
test directly from the paramount strict liability policy of spreading
the risk of loss to all the consumers of the product line so that the
product will bear the social and individual costs of its own defects.
In order to effectuate consistently this ultimate purpose of strict
liability, a transferee should be liable regardless of the existence and
solvency of the transferor and regardless of the assumption of the
transferor's business liabilities or the exploitation of the transferor's
goodwill. Continuity of product line is the only test based solely
upon strict liability policy considerations, and it is the only test that
will not lead to results inconsistent with the paramount goal of strict
liability. Consequently, transferee liability should be determined
solely by examining the resemblance of the transferor's defective
product to the product line being placed on the market by the transferee."
P.

ANTHONY LANNIE

82. It has not been the purpose of this Recent Development to explore fully the merits
and scope of a test basing transferee liability on continuity of product line. For a comprehensive discussion of the continuity of product line test see Note, supra note 25, at 1324-32.

